INBW42: A Philosophical Rabbit Hole of Considerations for Plan Sponsors and Others

Relentless Health Value™

There have been two episodes lately that have sent me down a rabbit hole that I wanted to bring to your attention. Now, disclaimer: I know you people; you’re busy. You listen on average to, like, 26 minutes of any given episode. So, yeah … look at me being self-aware.

I say all this to say welcome to this inbetweenisode, otherwise known as The Rabbit Hole. But it’s like a 20-something-minute rabbit hole, not a day-and-a-half retreat; so just be kind if you email me and tell me I forgot something or failed to dredge into a nuance or a background point. It might be that I just could not manage to pack it in.

For a full transcript of this episode, click here.

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This rabbit hole really, really matters for anybody creating benefit design. It really matters for anybody trying to optimize the health that can be derived from said benefit design. It also probably matters for a whole lot of operational decisions involving patients or members, nothing for nothing.

But it really matters for anybody trying not to, by accident, as an unintended consequence, hammer plan members or patients with some really blunt-force cost containment measures that do a lot of harm in the process of containing costs or, flip side, accidentally cost a whole lot but don’t actually improve member health.

Nina Lathia, RPh, MSc, PhD, kind of summed up this whole point or gave an adjacent thought really eloquently in episode 426. She said there’s better or worse ways to do things and doing the worst kinds of cost containment may not actually contain costs.

You squeeze a balloon, and that works great for some, like pharmacy vendors who don’t really have any skin in the game. (See me using the “skin in the game” term for other people besides plan members? That’s some really good foreshadowing right there, by the way.)

So, squeezing the balloon works for some when they don’t have skin in the game, in the place where the air goes when you squeeze the balloon—like a pharmacy vendor who makes it super unaffordable for patients to get meds so the patient doesn’t take their meds and winds up in the ICU, or the patient’s formerly controlled with meds condition that is now newly uncontrolled and requires all kinds of medical interventions to get said condition back under control. Like, these are the reasons and the why behind why some cost containment efforts don’t actually contain costs at the plan level.

But not at the vendor level. You see what I mean? Most pharmacy vendors don’t get penalized if medical costs wind up going up. And I’m picking on pharmacy vendors a little bit here, but it’s true for a lot of siloed entities.

But, you know, balloon squeezing can also work, actually, at the plan level if where the air goes, it’s to a place where the member or the patient has to pay themselves. Like, if there’s a huge, I don’t know, max out of pocket or deductible, does it really matter to a very mercenary plan that’s running on a very short time horizon? Do they really care, that plan, if the patient’s formerly controlled condition gets uncontrolled?

Maybe not, I guess, as long as it doesn’t cost more than the max out of pocket that the patient is on the hook for, for any given plan year.

So, yeah … again, there are better or worse ways to do things; and a lot of questions kind of add up to, What kind of plan do we want to be? What are our values, and does the plan align with them?

But that’s not the rabbit hole I wanted to go down today—the aligning with our values rabbit hole—so let us move on.

The Relentless Health Value episode that kicked off the rabbit hole for me on multiple levels was the show with Bill Sarraille (EP459) about co-pay maximizers and accumulators. And don’t get me wrong, that is a complicated topic with lots of pros, lots of cons; and I am not weighing in on the inherent lawfulness or value of any of this.

I am also not weighing in on the fact that there are forthright and well-run maximizers and really not good ones, which cause patients financial, for sure, and possibly clinical harm. But not talking about that right now at all. Go back and listen to the show with Bill Sarraille if you are interested.

Where my “down the rabbit hole” spiral started was when I started noticing the very, very common main plan pushback that was given right out of the gate so often when talking about the problems that any given plan sponsor has with these pharma co-pay programs—that if these pharmacopeia card dollars count toward the plan deductibles, then the patient’s deductible gets met and the plan member will then often overuse healthcare and cost the plan excessive dollars from that point forward.

So again, if you ask any given plan sponsor what I was gonna say their main issue but a main issue that they have with these pharma co-pay programs, that’s gonna be it—that if these pharma dollars count toward the plan deductible, then the patient’s deductible is met and from that point henceforth, the patient goes nuts and overuses healthcare services and it costs the plan a lot of money.

The second episode causing this rabbit hole to open up is the one coming up actually with Scott Conard, MD. So, check back in a couple of weeks for that one.

But in the show with Dr. Conard, we get into the impact of high-deductible health plans or just big out of pockets, however they transpire in the benefit design. Both of these scenarios, by the way, the maximizer meets the deductible scenario and the very, very high-deductible plan scenario are to blame, in other words, for this rabbit hole of an inbetweenisode. So, let’s do this thing.

Let’s talk about the moral hazard of insurance to start us off. In the context of health insurance, if you haven’t heard that term moral hazard before, it’s an economics term; and it is used to capture the idea that insurance coverage, by lowering the cost of care to the individual, because their plan is paying for part of said care, by lowering the cost of care to the individual, it increases healthcare use.

So, you could see why this may be related to having a deductible fully paid or not. Pre-deductible, the plan is not paying for a part of said care or paying a much smaller part. And after the deductible is paid for, then the plan is paying for a much larger percentage of care. So, moral hazard kicks in bigger after the deductible is fully paid, when the plan is paying for a bigger percentage or a bigger part of the care.

So, before I proceed, let me just offer again a disclaimer to the many economists who listen to this show that this is a short inbetweenisode; so I am 100% glossing over some of the points that, for sure, have a lot of nuance.

For anyone who wants a thick pack of pages for background reading, I have included some links below. Because you see, a few weeks ago, my Sunday did not go as planned. And instead of running errands, I wound up reading eight papers on moral hazard. So, my lack of groceries is your gain. You’re welcome. I am happy to send you these links if you really want to dig in hard on this.

Okay … so, moral hazard is the concept that individuals have incentives to offer their behavior when their risk or cost is borne by others. That’s the why with deductibles, actually. We gotta give patients skin in the game because once a member has their deductible paid, it’s like member gone wild and they will get all manner of excessive care.

Again, I hear that a lot from plan sponsors—a lot, in all kinds of contexts but almost always, again, whenever the conversation has anything to do with manufacturer co-pay card programs and a lot when it has to do with just, you know, high-deductible plans and what happens when the patient meets their deductible.

Once a patient or family has a fully paid deductible, their medical trend is like a spike, I hear over and over again. And again, this is the reason why many insist—and again, no judgment here, maybe they’re right, I’m just rehashing the conversation—but this is why many insist the moral hazard of letting people have their deductible paid for them by Pharma or whatever is the reason why some believe it is imperative to have maximizers or accumulators where pharma dollars can absolutely not apply to patient deductibles. Because then we have sick patients who now have their deductibles reached, who have very few financial disincentives to go seek whatever care they want. Right. Moral hazard has entered the building. I’ve beaten this point to death, so let’s move on.

One time, I asked a plan sponsor, What exactly is it that these plan members are going wild spending plan money on once their deductible gets paid off?

And he said, well, you know, they go get their suspicious-looking moles checked.

Did you hear that silence just now? Yeah, that was my reaction. I don’t know. I would consider getting suspicious moles checked kind of high-value care. There are posters all over the place saying if you have a suspicious-looking mole, it might be melanoma. Cancer. So, you should get ahead of that before you have a metastasized cancer. I’m no doctor, but yeah, this feels like high-value care. So, let’s just, in arguendo, say it is high-value care and follow this thread for a sec.

Once members reach their deductible, let’s say they run around and get high-value care, care they actually need but haven’t gotten before because they couldn’t afford it earlier or were putting it off until they saved up enough, right? Like, this is the other side of the moral hazard coin. If patients delay or abandon care—and, by the way, there was a survey (it’s in the Wayne Jenkins, MD, show from a while ago [EP358])—but 46% of patients with commercial insurance these days have delayed or abandoned care due to cost.

But if they delay or abandon care that is high value and medically actually necessary and they put it off or abandon that high-value care because they cannot afford said care, then yeah, we have, again, the opposite of the moral hazard problem. We have members paying a whole lot for insurance that they cannot afford to use, they’re functionally uninsured, and it’s not gonna end healthfully if they need high-value care and they’re not getting it. It’s not.

Functionally uninsured patients who have chronic conditions that really should be managed will, as per evidence, wind up with health problems if those chronic conditions are not managed. I read another study about this just recently. This is why members with chronic diseases on high-deductible health plans tend to have worse health, by the way.

Now, I need to say, same rules do not always apply for healthy patients who, at least at this point, don’t need regular healthcare. But do keep in mind, as it comes up in the Dr. Scott Conard show, 30% of patients who think they’re healthy, they feel fine—actually they are not fine and will become sick and costly in the coming years. So, yeah … tune back in for that discussion if you are interested, but you get the gist of this whole thing, right?

So, that’s scenario 1 as to what patients may choose to buy once they’re in the moral hazard zone and have met their deductible. They go get high-value care. So, let’s move on from the high-value care case study where patients reach their deductible and get high-value care or they haven’t met their deductible and fail to get care they actually need.

I want to circle over to the other moral hazard potential situation: patients who meet their deductible. And in this scenario, they again embark on a health system jamboree; but they don’t get a whole lot of high-value care in this scenario. They run around getting all manner of all kinds of stuff that is well outside of any evidence-based pathway.

Like, weird example, I went to a doctor recently asking a question about something that everyone ultimately agreed was nothing. At which point, the doctor asked if I wanted an MRI. I was like, “What?” We and everyone else just agreed this was a big nothing burger. Why would I want an MRI? Is there something else that we didn’t discuss to indicate that I need imaging? Like, why are we going there?

And the doc said, “Oh, well, everyone in New York City has an anxiety problem. So, I thought you might just want to get an MRI.” Yeah, low-value stuff like that is now not financially prohibitive. So, someone who had met their deductible, in a similar situation to my example, might have shrugged and said, “Sure, I do have some anxiety. Let’s go get that MRI.”

Or if they hadn’t met their deductible, then the whole skin-in-the-game, market-driven approach may work, I guess, to prevent them from getting low-value care that was clearly excessive and pretty wasteful.

So, summing up these two scenarios, the implications of the moral hazard issue are, if it’s expensive, people don’t do it. If it’s free or cheap, they will overutilize. And the issue with both of these patient choices is, patients are not good at discerning low-value care from high-value care.

And because patients are not good at discerning high-value from low-value care, moral hazard is not mitigated with any sort of binary kind of vote for moral hazard or against moral hazard types of brute-force, broad-stroke tactics. Like, say I’m a moral hazard full-on believer. I assume all or most of the care a patient will go for is low value, right? Because if I try to prevent moral hazard from happening, then by default, what I’m effectively saying is, whatever they choose to buy on the basis of moral hazard is low value.

So, I make basically everything I can pretty unaffordable so as not to invoke any moral hazard. But right, the problem with that is that some of the care is actually high value. And it’s also expensive for the patient, so they don’t get it. And patients are harmed, and balloons might get squeezed.

Or the opposite, against moral hazard, right? Like, I’m against the concept of moral hazard. I don’t believe in it, so I don’t set up absolutely anything to combat it. Maybe because I assume all care that a patient might want to get is actually high value and totally worth it. That’s gonna be a problem for the opposite reason.

Plans can waste a lot of money this way. Random example, in 2014, the Commonwealth of Virginia reported spending $586 million on unnecessary costs from low-value care. I mean, they say something like a third of all care is waste and unnecessary, so … yeah. Plan sponsors can waste a lot of money on low-value care, and a bunch of that may happen when patients have less skin in the game because they reach their deductible, as one example, and the care is not financially prohibitive and moral hazard is realized.

So, yeah … as I said, a couple of weeks ago, I did not spend my Sunday as planned. I spent my Sunday reading papers about moral hazard in insurance and how financial incentives impact patient decision making. And I’m gonna repeat the grand takeaway because this is a podcast and you might be multitasking.

So, once again, here’s the sum of it all: If it’s expensive, people tend not to do it. If it’s free or cheap, they will overutilize. And the issue with both of these patient choices is, patients are simply quite bad at distinguishing high-value care from low-value care. Once their deductibles are met, most patients will—due to moral hazard—they will, in fact, go on a spending spree; and part of what they will get done will be really, really important and necessary stuff, like getting their unusual moles looked at or their heart pain checked out or going for that follow-up visit or lab work that their doctor told them they need to come in for.

And the other part of what they will do will be things that are outside the best-practice, evidence-based pathway guidelines by the length of the Appalachian Trail—you know, doing what appears to be a tour of specialty medicine physicians for unclear reasons but which lead to a cascade of testing and who knows what else.

Why do they do this, these members? Do they do this on purpose? No. There is study after study that shows, again, members/patients do not, most of the time, have the chops to figure out if some medical service is high-value or low-value care. And no kidding. Most members and patients have no clinical training.

They’re not doctors. They’re not nurses. They’re not physician assistants. They’re humans whose uncle died of cancer, and now they have a pain in their foot and they’re convinced it’s a tumor.

Right? Like, do we blame them when they finally go see a doctor because they crushed their budget that particular year paying thousands and thousands of dollars out of pocket for whatever earlier in the year, and now they’ve made it to their deductible—do we blame them for taking the very rational step of getting the most out of those thousands of dollars of sunk costs? At that point, it’s a “let me get my money’s worth” situation because they can’t afford to do this again next year.

I mean, we hire employees because they’re smart and rational, and this is really actually a pretty smart and rational thing to do. It’s not somebody trying to commit fraud. Okay, sure … some people are. There’s always bad apples. But the vast majority are just trying to live their life and not spend all of their vacation money next year on medical services like they did this year.

I’m saying all this because it’s actionable, by the way. And I’m getting to that, but indulge me for like 60 more seconds because I want to acknowledge you, listeners of this show, are probably nodding along to this whole thing this whole time and thinking all of this is pretty obvious. Well, yeah … maybe.

Except here’s the reason I decided to do an inbetweenisode about this rabbit hole instead of doing my normal thing, which is just ranting about it over dinner for three days straight—and God bless my husband for sitting through it—is the bottom line. But the reason we are here together today is the number of emails and posts and et cetera that cross my desk where it doesn’t seem like these dots have been connected on all of this or at least connected in magic marker. Like fat, indelible magic marker, which is what I think is necessary for these dots to be connected with the ones between moral hazard and patients not being able to discern high- and low-value care.

There are so many ways and places these dots will show up. Like, here’s another moral hazard issue with those maximizers or accumulators, which apparently are on my mind right now—the not good ones I’m talking about now, where patients find themselves on the hook for hundreds or thousands of dollars midyear if they want to pick up the meds that they’ve been prescribed. If you need more details on how that might happen to understand what I’m saying fully, listen to the show again a couple of weeks ago with Bill Sarraille (EP459).

But even if you’re a little confused, it doesn’t matter because the question is this: Do we justify having programs that make drugs really expensive for patients? Do we put in place one of these pretty darn punitive types of accumulators or maximizers, right? Like, there’s different kinds, and I’m talking about the punitive ones of accumulators or maximizers. Do we justify putting one of those into place and figure that if a patient really wants the med, they’ll pay a whole lot of money for it? Because if they’re willing to pay a whole lot of money for it, then, right? It must be high-value care, so they’ll figure out how to pay for it.

Keep in mind, as I said earlier, if it’s expensive, people don’t do it. If it’s free or cheap, they will overutilize. And the issue with both of these patient choices is, patients are not good at discerning low-value care or meds from high-value care or meds.

So, look, Pharma can be up to all kinds of crap, and list prices are really expensive. No arguments here. That isn’t the point.

The point is, What is the actual problem that we’re trying to solve for, for our plan and our patients and our members? And if that problem is making sure that the right patients get the right high-value meds or care, then not letting members get co-pay assistance such that all drugs—the good ones and the too-expensive ones and the ones that we don’t really want our members to take for whatever reason—if we make all of them way too expensive with a maximizer or accumulator designed to make all the drugs really expensive … dots connected.

We wind up with the all-in to prevent moral hazard issue we just talked about, where patients could easily be harmed and the plan can easily get into a balloon squeezing situation.

All I’m saying is that there’s a big-picture view of moral hazard here that we need to be looking at and over-indexing into binary, moral hazard black and white, where we attribute malice to members, some of whom, some of the time, may actually be trying to get high-value care, or the flip side, the plan’s paying too much for low-value care and causing financial difficulties and not understanding the root cause.

Going black and white or over-indexing to prevent outlier kind of stuff is probably not gonna end well. Not seeking a middle way can easily result in a solution that is possibly worse than the problem.

So, look, moral hazard is actually a thing. There are lots of implications to patients not being able to distinguish high-value and low-value care. But if we know this, then, philosophically at least, how do we conceptualize a solve? What should we be doing? If we’re not doing black and white, what does the gray in the middle look like?

Alright, we don’t want to be a solution looking around for a problem. So, let’s think about the problems that we want to solve for. I would start with, What’s the goal? The goal of plan sponsors providing insurance most of the time is attract and retain talent.

Also, I was at the HBCH (Houston Business Coalition on Health) Conference at the beginning of December 2024. And there was a poll question. There was a bunch of employers in the audience, and the poll question asked the audience, “What’s your biggest plan goal this year?” Main answer by a mile: Cut costs. Okay … so, we want to attract and retain, and we want to control costs. Obviously, you can go about achieving these three things a bunch of different ways, and they will all be tradeoffs.

As Luke Prettol reminded me of the other day, there are no solutions, only tradeoffs.

And so, with that, right now, I want to introduce the second concept that I have been ruminating over in my rabbit hole lately, that I’ve kind of been hinting at for this whole time. But here’s a word we’ve been waiting for to solve all of our problems in a good kind of way, not the bad black-and-white ways that are so often either financially a problem or deploying brute force and harming patients in the name of solving something else: Pareto optimality.

Pareto optimality is the state where resources are allocated as efficiently as possible so that improving one criterion will not worsen other criteria. It’s essential to consider this, that Pareto optimality is the ideal we should at least be striving for when attempting to overcome any challenge but, in particular, the moral hazard issue, when we know that patients do not know what care is high value and what care is low value. Because if we don’t try to at least Pareto optimize (if that’s a word), if we try to fix the moral hazard problem and wind up with a new problem or new problems that might be worse than the old problem, that’s not optimal. We have improved one criterion and worsened another.

So, fixing the members going wild after they meet their deductible by slamming the lid on the fingers of members trying to get high-value care as well as low-value care, well … not sure about this, but I’d assume if not the attract but at least the retain criterion might be compromised by member dissatisfaction.

But also, as I’ve said nine times, we might not actually cut costs. We might be doing a squeeze of the balloon. Especially that could be true when, as we all probably know or suspect, what’s driving costs at the plan level is rising hospital prices.

There’s a show coming up on rising hospital prices as a primary driver of rising plan costs, and it’s pretty hard to argue with. So, it’s financially pretty advantageous to keep patients from needing to go to the hospital. So, yeah … I’d strongly suggest not squeezing balloons when hospitalizations are where the air goes.

I’m not gonna belabor this. My only suggestion is, do the Pareto optimality math. A lot of you already are, I’m sure, and do a great job. But just for any given policy plan change, or decision, keep in mind moral hazard and then really go through the whole cascade of likely impact on other factors based on likely member/patient behavior.

It’s so easy to get sucked into kind of these philosophical, “those are my enemies” kinds of conversations that are actually philosophically sort of interesting, but they aren’t the goal. I mean, there’s always unintended consequences; but not all unintended consequences should come as some kind of, like, wild-ass surprise. They were pretty predictable, actually.

Let me also mention that when considering Pareto optimal solutions, advanced primary care starts to get really compelling. It’s because having a PCP team with data and a relationship to the patient helps patients stay on the high-value care bus. And that can minimize the bad that comes from lowering the barrier to care and inviting in a little bit of moral hazard. Just saying.

Okay, so this has been going on a little bit longer than I had originally intended, but I do want to remind you of the so-called theory of second best. It’s probably really appropriate here, and one of the reasons why I’m mentioning this and not finishing the show right now is that, in a very synchronistic moment, I was writing up my outline for this inbetweenisode and—how random is this?—Steve Schutzer, MD, wrote an email that included something about the theory of second best. Great minds and all of that.

Anyway, the theory of second best is really aligned with Pareto optimality. It’s just that sometimes you gotta be really practical. You gotta be a little scrappy. If you cannot achieve the best option, either because you just can’t or because the best option for one thing results in too many negative consequences elsewhere, then don’t do the best option. Forget it. Do the second best (ie, the theory of second best). There is nothing wrong with that. Don’t be a hero.

Okay, so in summary, moral hazard is actually a thing and so is the opposite; and it’s even more of an impactful thing because most people cannot distinguish high-value from low-value care.

And if they meet their deductible that they have paid a lot of money to reach, of course, they are going to want to try to get through their checklist of medical appointments that they have been putting off. This is not a surprise.

And it’s not all bad, as long as the care that they are trying to go get is high value; and that matters if we’re trying to cut costs. Because to cut costs for real and not in a squeezing of the balloon way, we need to direct or limit somehow what gets done to high-value care. And we got to do that without accidentally causing other problems, meaning think through Pareto optimality and possibly consider the theory of second best.

I hope this has been helpful at some level. It’s helped me. I feel better having vented.

Also mentioned in this episode are Nina Lathia, RPh, MSc, PhD; Bill Sarraille; Scott Conard, MD; Wayne Jenkins, MD; Houston Business Coalition on Health (HBCH); Luke Prettol; and Steve Schutzer, MD.

Additional studies mentioned:

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It

Do People Choose Wisely After Satisfying Health Plan Deductibles? Evidence From the Use of Low-Value Health Care Services

Healthcare and the Moral Hazard Problem

Distinguishing Moral Hazard From Access for High-Cost Healthcare Under Insurance

For more information, go to aventriahealth.com.

Each week on Relentless Health Value, Stacey uses her voice and thought leadership to provide insights for healthcare industry decision makers trying to do the right thing. Each show features expert guests who break down the twists and tricks in the medical field to help improve outcomes and lower costs across the care continuum. Relentless Health Value is a top 100 podcast on iTunes in the medicine category and reaches tens of thousands of engaged listeners across the healthcare industry.

In addition to hosting Relentless Health Value, Stacey is co-president of QC-Health, a benefit corporation finding cost-effective ways to improve the health of Americans. She is also co-president of Aventria Health Group, a consultancy working with clients who endeavor to form collaborations with payers, providers, Pharma, employer organizations, or patient advocacy groups.

04:05 Where did Stacey’s rabbit hole spiral start?

05:40 What is the moral hazard of insurance?

09:31 EP358 with Wayne Jenkins, MD.

12:49 Why isn’t moral hazard mitigated in insurance?

18:16 EP459 with Bill Sarraille.

20:51 “How do we conceptualize a solve?”

22:24 Why should we be striving for Pareto optimality?

25:20 What is the theory of second best?

For more information, go to aventriahealth.com.

Our host, Stacey Richter, discusses considerations for #plansponsors and others. #healthcare #podcast #changemanagement #healthcareleadership #healthcaretransformation #healthcareinnovation

Recent past interviews:

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